Northern Illinois University

Huskie Commons
Northerner Historical Review

Student Research & Projects

1-1-2013

The Economics of Genocide: Cambodia’s Financial Collapse Prior
to Year Zero, 1950-1975
Ron Leonhardt

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/history-studentnorthernerreview

Custom Citation
Leonhardt, Ron. "The Economics of Genocide: Cambodia’s Financial Collapse Prior to Year Zero,
1950-1975," The Northerner Historical Review, Volume 1, Number 1, 2013.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research & Projects at Huskie Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Northerner Historical Review by an authorized administrator of Huskie
Commons. For more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

The Economics of Genocide: Cambodia’s Financial
Collapse Prior to Year Zero, 1950-1975

Name: Ron Leonhardt
University: Northern Illinois University
Email: Ron.M.Leonhardt@gmail.com
Address: 345 Augusta Ave. DeKalb, IL 60115
Phone: (815) 222-4115

2

Collapse of the French Protectorate
Theoretical and Historical Frameworks
During the twentieth century, Western political scientists postulated that a state reaching
modernity would be formidable combatant against the spread of international communism. As
Walt Whitman Rostow, National Security Advisor during the Johnson administration and an
ardent supporter of the modernization theory, noted, when societies reach maturity, citizens
become “aware and anxious to acquire the consumption fruits of a mature economy.” Rostow
argued that, since Marxist theory focused on supply rather than demand, consumerism would
likely cause Communism “to wither in the age of high mass-consumption.”1 In the early 1950s,
the United States attempted to solidify a political and economic alignment with Cambodia that
would not only prevent communist encroachment, but would also help build a state strong
enough to repel communism on its own. However, the economic and military aid provided by the
United States to help Cambodia build a modern state propelled Cambodia toward communism
rather than away from it. Although there are many mitigating social, political, and regional
dimensions that participated in giving rise to the Khmer Rouge, this paper will focus on how the
United States hindered Cambodia’s path to modernity and, in doing so, made Cambodia
vulnerable to communist infiltration.
Following the Lisbon Conference in 1952, the United States increased its economic and
military aid to the French mission in Indochina from $300 million to $800 million, which was to
be used to help France with the “reconstruction and expansion” of their domestic economy and
the economy of their overseas territories. Granting such a substantial amount of assistance
hinged on France’s promise to begin to recognize the “importance of adopting and pursuing
economic and financial policies designed to lead [the Indochinese states] to eventual
1
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independence of aid.” 2 Along with indirect economic aid to Indochina, the United States also
began pursuing direct economic ties to Indochina without French involvement. By 1953, the
United States had conducted roughly $25 million worth of direct trade with Indochina with the
intent of accustoming Indochina to the purchase and use of American products.3 This was, of
course, much to the dismay of French officials who were still adjusting to the loss of exclusive
trading rights within their colonies. This pre-independence trade between the United States and
Cambodia served as the seedlings of the further economic partnership that would arise as
Cambodia solidified its independence.
King Norodom Sihanouk took political control of Cambodia on November 9, 1953
following Cambodia’s independence from the French Protectorate. The National Bank of
Cambodia (NBC) was established in December of 1954, and the riel took the place of the
Indochinese piaster as the official currency of Cambodia. King Sihanouk, under the guise of the
Sangkum Reastr Niyum movement, attempted to implement a mixed-economy enterprise, which
put individual capital under the guidance of the state to safeguard against “‘privileged capitalists,
national or foreign.’”4 However, along with nationalizing various business sectors, Sihanouk had
to rely on foreign investors and investments to help industrialize Cambodia. No longer under the
protection of the Protectorate, foreign assistance was needed to purchase machinery, raw
materials, and building materials for basic modes of industrial production as Cambodia had little
own-source revenue. Even with the industries that remained intact following independence,
Cambodia had to rely on foreign industrial workers as there were few domestic technicians that
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knew how to operate industrial equipment and machinery.5 In the 1950s, the United States
trained 184 Cambodians in the United States and other countries in government and agricultural
practices. Over 400 Cambodians also received on-site training through Cambodian-American
agricultural assistance programs.6 Despite such United States technical support, it was
counterintuitive for the Sangkum’s ultimate goal of freeing Cambodia from capitalist influences.
Such programs, as much as they were needed, only solidified the U.S.-Cambodian economic ties
and produced tighter, yet unequal, trade relations.
According to Phlek Chhat, the Director-General of Plan, it was necessary to rely on
foreign aid to “achieve rapidly the large-scale works necessary” to industrialize Cambodia.
However, the Sihanouk government recognized the dangers of forming alliances with exploitive
Western states; thus, Sihanouk attempted to achieve economic neutrality, which according to the
Sangkum, meant a “balanced adaptation of [capitalism and communism] for the organization of
the country.”7 This meant accepting economic aid from both Western and communist states; this
nonalignment posture, however, created difficulties for Sihanouk as the United States did not
want Cambodia forming any ties with the East.

Cold War Humanitarianism
The Decline of Nonalignment
Despite the Sangkum’s “economic neutrality,” the United States exported over $36
million worth of goods to Cambodia before 1955 and still hoped its economic assistance
programs could provide a solid foundation from which Cambodia could modernize. Through a
section of the United States’ aid program, organized by the International Cooperation
5
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Administration (ICA) in 1954, the United States funded the completion of le Barray Occidental
d’Angkor, which provided “irrigation for 20,000 hectares.” The United States agreed to “build a
dam in Kompong-Cham” that provided irrigation for farming. In Prey-Chhor, 4,000 hectares of
irrigation networks were organized and another small irrigation network outside of KompongCham and Kompong-Thom provinces were constructed with the support of United States aid.8
The United States also helped fund the completion of a 9,000 hectares irrigation channel in
Kompong-Cham that had been unfinished since 1944; it was finally finished with United States
support in 1957. In a country comprised of a rural population of over 80 percent, the Sangkum, in
conjunction with the United States, attempted to modernize the peasantry and gain its support
through more effective agricultural methods. As Jean Delvert noted, “the politics of water are
indispensable.”9 However, such agriculture reforms failed to have the lasting impact that the
United States hoped the reforms would have.
Through funding such infrastructure projects, the United States hoped to consummate a
monogamous relationship with Cambodia, but the Soviet Union and Communist China severely
obfuscated the U.S.-Cambodian relationship. Sihanouk understood the geopolitical implications
of “playing both sides.” In one instance, in 1957, Sihanouk responded to the United States’
unwillingness to allocate more aid with the remark, “‘we might go Communist if you stop the
aid.’”10 Consequently, the United States remained eager to supply the aid necessary to persuade
Sihanouk against aligning with the East. Also in 1957, the United States began constructing the
Khmer-American Friendship Highway from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh at a cost of $32
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million for the 140 miles of roadway.11 Coincidentally, as the Vietnam War escalated,
communist forces used this highway as an extension of the Ho Chi Minh Trail to transport
weapons and munitions to North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. In the same year, the French
began reconstruction on the port of Sihanoukville. However, according to Jean Delvert, the funds
used to build the port were actually provided by United States and then funneled through a
French economic aid program.12
The future Khmer Rouge leader, Khieu Samphan, acknowledged quite presciently, that
the “regulation of relations with foreign countries is essential.”13 He argued that industrialization
was possible, but he believed it could not be achieved by the government continuing to allow
foreign investors to exploit Cambodia’s economy. In many ways, Samphan was correct in such
assertions. The Sangkum failed to regulate foreign investment, and Sihanouk’s industrialization
programs only produced a harsher environment for the peasantry. According to Samphan, trade
with the United States comprised of 12.35 percent of Cambodia’s total trade value in the late
1950s. Yet, he claims, this neglects to factor in trade indirectly originating from the United
States. Cambodia’s trade with Hong Kong, South Vietnam, Thailand, and Japan all indirectly
pulled Cambodia into a closer alignment with the United States. Samphan also noted that many
foreign investments could be traced back to larger United States corporations such as the General
Insurance Company, New Hampshire Fire Company, and American International Insurance
Company. 14 Such tight economic ties to the United States—whether direct or indirect—
contradicted the Sangkum’s policy of economy neutrality.
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The United States made aid appropriation decisions based on whether the aid would
enhance or hinder United States interests in Cambodia. Similarly, the majority of Sihanouk’s
time in office was spent shuffling between allegiances to various superpowers in an attempt to
receive aid, protection, or formal recognition from any state willing to grant such requests. In
return, however, the superpowers spoke of Cambodia as a second-rate state and caused
considerable damage to its domestic stability. Upon returning from his trip to China in 1958,
Prince Sihanouk, in an obvious attempt at manipulation, informed United States officials that the
Chinese Communists had offered him substantial military and economic aid increases, but he
took only an additional $5.6 million to supplement the existing Chinese aid package of $22.4
million. Sihanouk claimed that he felt uneasy accepting “such aid from both sides” and that he
was happy with the aid packages offered by the United States. Sihanouk, in effect, was being
courted by both the East and the West and he used it to his advantage to acquire the maximum
amount of aid from all three superpowers.15
This occurred again in 1960 when Sihanouk asked the United States to provide Cambodia
with eight fighter jets. The United States debated whether to grant the request, but the United
States determined if they denied the request, Sihanouk might turn to China for the aircrafts. The
United States then angrily discovered that Chou En-lai, the Chinese Premier, had already
promised to provide Cambodia with the aircrafts.16 Such economic and military aid infused
foreign revenue into Cambodia, which made Cambodia dependent on such aid. When these
foreign aid packages and investments were removed or detrimentally altered, as they often were,
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it left Cambodia without the national revenue necessary to conduct normal governmental
functions.

Predation at the International Marketplace
In the Riel We Distrust
Even more fiscally caustic than Cambodia’s relationships with foreign investors were the
foreign investments used to fund infrastructure projects that did not create own-source revenue.
During the Sangkum period, the Independence Monument, the Cambodiana Hotel, and the
Olympic National Sports Stadium were constructed and the Bokor Palace was renovated. This
created two significant problems. Firstly, it induced financial imbalances when these investments
did not create domestic economic growth. Cambodia was not able to produce revenue from a
project like the Bokor Palace; thus, when Cambodia could not pay its loans or continue spending
without foreign investments, the riel lost value and prices went up. Secondly, and more
importantly, such economic hardships became the burden of the peasantry. The elites associated
with Sihanouk’s government, according to one official working at the Phnom Penh Post Office,
had “‘sumptuous villas, luxury cars and lead an enviable life’” despite the economic downturn.17
Coincidentally, one of those elites, Songksad Kitpanich, made a fortune from the bankruptcy of a
private Cambodian bank, which created distrust in the Cambodian economy and destabilized the
riel. He then fled to Bangkok where he organized the finances of the Khmer Serei and helped
disperse the money to fund Son Ngoc Thanh’s operations.18 Thus, the man who undermined the
growth of a Cambodian economy funded by the United States eventually joined an anti-Sihanouk
movement also funded by the United States.

17
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In an effort to aid Cambodia, the United States also engaged in currency exchange
practices that encouraged corruption and Cambodian income inequalities. The United States
participated in currency triangulation that, in theory, intended to provide the National Bank of
Cambodia with domestic currency so that Cambodia could fund its own infrastructure projects.
The United States exported goods to France, which the French would pay for with francs. Those
francs would then be granted to Cambodia and South Vietnam to import goods from other states
within the franc zone. By 1957, over 60 percent of French exports to Indochina were paid for
with these triangulated francs.19 However, this caused several fractures in the Cambodian
economy. Currency triangulation helped turn Cambodia into an economy hinged on imports.
Cambodia increased its imports from $47.6 million in 1956 to $74.9 million in 1958.20 This
substantial rise in imports can be traced back to the United States economic assistance and
Washington’s triangulation of currency. Cambodia, a state traditionally reliant on selfsubsistence farming, had become dependent on foreign imports.
Moreover, the imports were often not used in a financially responsible manner. As Khieu
Samphan illustrated, by the 1930s, imports for 90 percent of the population consisted of only 4
percent of the total imports to Indochina. The elites, roughly 10 percent of the Indochinese
population, directed 49 percent of the imports towards non-essential items. The composition of
imports, as will be detailed later, did not change by the 1960s; the elite still dominated the
imports. Thus, by the United States providing aid and triangulated currency, it did little to
stimulate economic projects that benefitted Cambodia as a whole; rather it served to solidify the
lavish lifestyles of the elites. 21
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The second problem associated with currency triangulation to provide francs and riels for
Cambodian development was that there were loopholes for such currency exchanges. Through
June 1959, the United States had provided Cambodia with roughly $140 million for Cambodians
to purchase imports from “all the countries of the free world.”22 However, such aid for import
purchases did not always have the intended impact. Foreign traders utilized currency exchanges,
which had to be submitted to the Office National des Changes, to sell or invest a percentage of
the transaction on a parallel market as exporters could opt to transfer about 13 percent of the
wholesale value of an export and 75 percent of the profit off an export into a separate exportsincidental accessories account. Due to discrepancies in international currency valuations, the
influx of foreign investors trading within the Cambodian markets, and these legal loopholes in
the Cambodian exchange policies, wealthy traders were able to make a substantial profit.
Moreover, the exports of certain products, referred to as “échanges compensés,” were tied to the
imports of other products, which then allowed wealthy traders to make additional profits from
the international import and exports markets.23 By 1963, this parallel market had raised the
average rate of currency exchanges to 82 riels per $1 dollar, rather than the official rate of 35:1.
This also created trade incongruities as foreign exporters profited far greater off exports than a
Cambodian exporter, who did not have access to this parallel market. Despite the United States
attempting to protect currency exchanges and increase the national supply of riels for domestic
development, currency triangulation also allowed the domestic and foreign elites to prey on
Cambodia’s weak, foreign-driven economy.

22
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Independence Becomes Interdependence
Dependency through Trade
By the end of the 1950s, rubber was the only Cambodian export that the United States
felt was a viable trade commodity in the West. The Communist Bloc began courting the
Cambodian government in early 1956, which resulted in trade agreements with Communist
China, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Poland.24 Undoubtedly, such bilateral trade
agreements with Communist Bloc states worried the United States—despite the fact that such
trade agreements were in accordance with Cambodia’s notion of economic neutrality.
Cambodia’s neutrality posture, however, did not quell the concerns of United States officials. In
a 1952 study prepared by the United States State Department, the United States determined that
Southeast Asia contained 90 percent of the world’s natural rubber and Communist acquisition of
rubber resources “would enormously increase their war potential.”25 As a result, the United
States not only intended to prevent Communist encroachment into Cambodia, but also to solidify
exclusive trading rights with Cambodia in regards to their strategic resources.
Thus, in 1950, 48,000 tons of rubber was produced in Vietnam and Cambodia. By 1952,
it was predicted that these two countries would produce 60,000 tons of rubber.26 In 1954, more
exports were going to the United States than France.27 In 1955, rubber comprised of 45 percent
of Cambodia’s total exports; by the end of the 1950s, rubber had reached roughly 55 percent of
Cambodia’s total exports, and, in 1960, rubber accounted for nearly 69 percent.28 Creating ownsource revenue was an extremely important facet of Sihanouk’s plan to industrialize Cambodia,
24
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and such a growing market for rubber exports could have been a positive sign for the growth of
Cambodia’s economy. However, the exportation of rubber failed to help Cambodia effectively
modernize.
One of the biggest shortcomings of Cambodia’s increased rubber exportation was that not
only was rubber tapping merely a commodity market without any really modernizing attributes,
the exports also were usually not own-source revenue. For instance, the formerly French owned
La Société Khmère des plantations d'Hévéas (SKPH) turned over its plantation to the Cambodian
government in 1958, which was then supposed to sell shares of SKPH to domestic investors. As
generous as this may seem, by the late 1960s, the majority of rubber production was still done by
foreign rubber companies that tapped around 50,000 hectares of rubber. This is compared to the
roughly 4,500 hectares tapped by Cambodian private investors. Not only did Sihanouk’s
economic program allow for foreign investors to remain in control of Cambodia’s resources, but
self-subsistence farmers did not have the assets to buy public shares of these nationalized
businesses—only the elite class had any real possibility of acquiring shares to these companies.
Sihanouk’s government was also unable to organize adequate tax practices. Private
enterprises made up nearly 85 percent of Cambodia’s revenue, yet they only contributed to 15
percent of the taxes that were collected.29 Thus, although the United States was attempting to aid
Cambodia in instituting a strong and stable state, Sihanouk’s government was unable to
implement and enforce policies that could have stabilized its economy. Due to a poor
agricultural season in 1955, Cambodia had a budget deficit of $10 million. Instead of Cambodia
beginning to construct positive reforms, such as equal tax policies, the Sihanouk government
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simply allowed the deficit to “be offset by US assistance.”30 Such misallocations of United States
aid did not have a devastating impact on the Cambodian economy in the 1950s, but this weak
economic foundation became the impetus for Cambodia’s economic paralysis of the 1960s and
1970s.
The more aid Prince Sihanouk asked for, the more he received. By 1963, the United
States was providing the salary for a large portion of the Cambodian army, which consisted of
30,000 soldiers. The United States, between 1956 and 1963, provided Cambodia with $365
million in aid. Yet, there was still cause for concern as Cambodia began to gravitate toward the
two Communist orbits of influence. According to an article by The Economist, “the Americans
called Prince Sihanouk a maniac. The Prince replied by saying that the face of the United States
was ‘not noble,’ and that he could not bring himself to hold out his hand to take the American aid
which, regrettable, was so necessary for his country.”31 Thus, in November 1963, Sihanouk
publicly denounced the United States’ influence over Cambodia. This allowed China and the
Soviet Union the opportunity to consolidate an economic partnership with Cambodia.
Consequently, China armed 27,000 Cambodian soldiers in late 1964, armed an additional 10,000
soldiers in early 1965, supplied anti-aircraft weapons, helped fund the construction of the
National Olympic Stadium and an international airport in Siem Riep, and provided eleven
combat planes to Cambodia.32
During this period, the Soviet Union built a Soviet-Khmer Friendship hospital in Phnom
Penh, a “superior technical school for 1000 students,” provided 500 million riels in monetary aid,
30
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and supplied Cambodia with four jet fighters including a MIG 15 and a MIG 17.33 Then, in 1966,
Chinese officials asked Sihanouk to allow supplies to be shipped into the port of Sihanoukville.
Prince Sihanouk agreed, but recalled, “‘two thirds for the Viet Cong, one third for yourself. At
that rate one sells oneself.”’34 Assuredly, not only did the Chinese and Soviets provide Cambodia
with such large allotments of aid to bring him closer to the Chinese and Soviet orbits, but such
aid also persuaded him away from the West.

Sihanouk’s Eastern Associates
“Breaking” with the West
However, despite Sihanouk’s denouncement of the West in November 1963 and his
closer ties to the East, the United States still retained an intensive economic partnership with
Cambodia after 1963. Sihanouk criticism of the United States was more to gain publicity for
Cambodia’s plight and out of fear of anti-government groups such as the Khmer Serei. As
Sihanouk described in 1963, Cambodia “will never realize an independent economy” if
Cambodia continues to associate with a state “organized around corruption, which as a
consequence, creates dependence for our country.”35 Yet, Sihanouk desired United States’
assistance more than a cessation of the assassination plots against him. Although Cambodian
exports to the United States declined from $9 million in 1963 to $2.2 million in 1965, this cannot
wholly be attributed to Sihanouk cutting off economic relations with the United States as
Cambodian exports had steadily declined since 1959. This had more to do with the increased
Cambodian dependence on imports and external foreign investment, which both did not create
own-source revenue or a base of exportable goods. The United States was still importing at least
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$2 million worth of rubber throughout the early 1960s, which the United States even admitted
was Cambodia’s only viable trade commodity in the West. The Cambodian imports from the
United States actually increased in the years after breaking economic ties from $8.2 million in
1963 to $26.3 million in 1965.36 Despite Sihanouk’s distaste for the United States’ imperial
tendencies, such distaste did not significantly hinder trade between these two states.
The increased imports despite “poor” relations with the United States during this period
can be partly attributed to elite pressure on Sihanouk to continue trading with the United States.
This can be seen in the items that were imported during the 1960s as they were not materials
used by the peasantry. The third highest category, in millions of riels, of imports in 1963 was
“Distractions, Culture, and Hygiene.” It is doubtful that a peasantry, overcome with debt in this
period, would have the funds to spend on imports labeled “distractions” or “culture.” Moreover,
the highest import in 1963 was “Clothing and Apparel.” The peasantry may have contributed to
the imports for this category, but considering nearly 90 percent of the households in Phnom Penh
in 1962 that spent money on these clothing imports, spent between 600-1,200 riels a month on
clothing, it is doubtful that the high importation of clothing was due to the spending of the
peasantry, who by 1969 still did not make over 2,000 riels per year.37 Thus, during the period of
icy relations between Cambodia and the United States, the influence of the elite class on the
government’s decision-making process coupled with their taste for Western goods likely
contributed to the continuation of trade between these two states.38
Yet, despite the continuation of millions of dollars’ worth of trade between Cambodia
and the United States after 1963, Cambodia did begin to foster closer ties to the two Communist
orbits. In 1965, Cambodia was exporting over $43 million, mainly rice exports, to China. China
36

Prud’homme, 263-270.
Meyer, 209; Gardère, 343.
38
Prud’homme, 260-261.
37

16

also exported nearly $40 million worth of goods to Cambodia that same year.39 This correlates to
U.S.-Cambodian relations because as trade relations and aid allotments increased between
Cambodian and the two Communist superpowers, communist military activity increased in
Cambodia as well. This brought the United States, which had yet to conduct any significant
military operations in Cambodia, closer to conducting such operations. These operations began
in 1967 and tragically altered the Cambodian landscape and devastated local economies and
communities.

The United States Indefinitely Intervenes
Bombs and Border Excursions
In 1967, the Central Intelligence Agency observed, “South of Attopeu, Route 110
underwent considerable improvement…Route 97 which provides the road connection between
Route 110 and Siem Pang, Cambodia was reopened to traffic in early January.”40 Unbeknownst
to Prince Sihanouk at the time, by supporting Communist actions within Cambodia, he
effectively helped secure his demise as the United States began to play a more active role in
finding a Sihanouk replacement who would not allow such concessions to Communist forces.
Also in 1967, top-secret teams of United States soldiers, in operations code-named Operation
Salem House, later code-named Daniel Boone Operations, penetrated into Cambodia to seek out
Communist sanctuaries. Once the missions commenced, it became clear that Communist forces
were utilizing Cambodian territory to a much greater extent than previously imagined. These
reconnaissance missions led to the first major bombing run conducted in Cambodia. Operation
Breakfast, conducted on March 18, 1969 against Base Area 353, would change the course of the
Vietnam War in Cambodia. Over the course of the bombing campaigns, over 2,500,000 tons of
39
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ordnance was dropped over Cambodia; more tons of ordnance was dropped over Cambodia than
the entire Allied Forces dropped in all of the Second World War. It is conservatively estimated
that between 50,000 and 150,000 Cambodian civilians were killed during the roughly eight years
of United States bombing activity. 41
The United States bombing campaigns brought obvious animosity as a result of civilian
deaths, but there were also economic factors due to the bombings that helped fuel anti-U.S.
sentiment within Cambodia. As one Cambodian recalled, “the bombings caused damages to the
paddy field—the paddy—the rice fields and the bridges.”42 Moreover, Sao Sarun, a Khmer
Rouge cadre, reported that in the Mondulkiri providence “there was no market, no exchange of
goods, not even in the provincial town. And that applies to the rural areas as well. The main
cause was due to the heavy bombardment. The bombardments sometimes took place four or five
times per day.”43 Historically a self-sufficient state in terms of rice production, the intense
bombing campaigns severely inhibited the Cambodian population from producing rice. As the
number of sorties increased in the early 1970s, there was a distinct decrease in rice production.
From 1969 to 1970, rice production (in millions) dropped from 3,814 metric tons to 2,732 metric
tons. By 1973, the year the bombings stopped, rice production was down to 762 metric tons. On
a similar note, corn production (in millions) in Cambodia dropped from 137 metric tons in 1969
to 73 metric tons in 1972-1973.44 Moreover, it was unsafe to navigate on 40 percent of the roads
and over ⅓ of the bridges in Cambodia had been blown up. After several years of such heavy
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bombing, according to one United States Air Force map, “thousands of square miles of densely
populated, fertile areas” were “black from inundation.”45
One of the main objectives of Operation Ranch Hand was to establish “a denuded area
along Viet-Nam borders (with Cambodia, or Laos, or both) to check Viet Cong infiltration.”46
This led to many instances of defoliant and herbicide use in Cambodian civilian villages and
agricultural fields. In a study conducted by a team of United States scientists, led by Dr. Charles
E. Minarik, in 1969, it was determined that 70,000 hectares and about 15,000 hectares of rubber
and fruit production areas were damaged due to the use of these chemicals. The majority of the
damage was done within the Dar and Prek Chlong plantations. Some of the damage, done to a
litany of different plants species, had a “die-back of one to four years of branch growth.”47 Little
regard was given for how the use of these chemicals could affect the viability of Cambodia.
Charles Meyer noted, “all of the rubber plantations were methodically ravaged, with no military
causality, by the spreading of defoliants and the bombardments.”48
The loss of functioning agricultural and industrial areas was not the only aspect of the
United States military operations that hindered Cambodia’s solidification of a solid, non-foreign
driven economy. The elites allowed the military operations to persist without much opposition as
these elites economically relied on the West to provide them with the benefits of Western
capitalism. Some Khmer Republic officials made, by some estimates, 25,000 riels per month,
bought expensive houses, and “owned two or three cars of which often were Mercedes.”49
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Cambodian officials allowed United States military intervention in part to uphold these
extravagant living standards.
The Cambodian government also received compensation for each civilian harmed by the
United States bombing campaigns. The United States government paid $400 per body, $150 for
non-fatal casualties, and $100 for lesser injuries; by early 1970, one United States official
admitted that he had “paid out $24,850 in such relief.”50 From the perspective of the elitist
Cambodian government, there was little motivation to denounce United States’ intervention. The
elites were profiting very nicely off the destabilized economy; the peasantry’s plight was a mere
afterthought. Such military operations actually drew popular support to communism rather than
repelling it and made Cambodia’s modernization an impossibility. Although the United States
hinged its anti-communist policy on the modernization theory, its actions were counterintuitive
in this instance.

Corruption and Cronyism in the Khmer Republic
The Predatory Elite
Once Sihanouk was overthrown in 1970, the Lon Nol government quickly aligned itself
with the United States. Corruption and cronyism ran rampant during this period in part because
of the loose controls set on United States economic assistance. In 1958, the average rural peasant
made 1,700 riels per year.51 Yet, the average yearly wage of all Cambodians workers—including
elites and the peasantry—was 3,700 riels in 1963.52 The wide gap between the rich and the poor
is explicitly illustrated by this statistic as despite over 80 percent of the population being
comprised of the peasantry, the average yearly income was still much higher than the yearly
income of the peasantry. By 1969, the average rural peasant still did not make over 2,000 riels
50
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per year while the average civil servant made 5,000 riels a month.53 Thus, by the early 1970s, the
peasantry was in desperate need of humanitarian aid.54
However, humanitarian aid was often misappropriated as well. Lon Nol allocated the
majority of economic aid to support the lavish lifestyles of his government cohorts. The
opportunistic and predatory elite took advantage of the loose controls on foreign aid. By some
estimates, roughly half of the $350 million in U.S. aid provided in 1974 went directly for private
gain. When Lon Nol’s brother, Lon Non, left Cambodia in 1973, he had made over $90 million
dollars in an inhospitable economic climate.55 Corruption was not only widespread, but it came
at the expense of the peasantry. As the Prime Minister of the Khmer Republic, Long Boret,
stated in 1973, “‘the elite, which consumes a large part of imported merchandise, have suffered
rises in the cost of living far less noticeable than the middle and working classes.’”56 Despite
economic stagnation, the elite somehow still prospered—an unsettling fact for a starving and
landless peasantry.
Moreover, the United States’ “Food for Peace” program, PL-480, relied on, under its
Title I stipulations, concessions and loans that were then used to generate funds to pay for the
expanding military budget.57 The peasantry, unable to rise above the constant indebtedness that
Cambodia’s dual economy imposed on them, began to form closer ties to the Khmer Rouge. As
H.E. Tal Nay Im, the current director general of the NBC, reported, inflation was unavoidable
during this period as the budget deficit was being corrected with currency advances by the NBC.
In order for the Lon Nol government to pay its civil servants, the NBC was forced to print more
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currency just to keep the government functioning. Thus, the riel and the economy as a whole
depended on foreign aid just to stay afloat. Yet, in accepting such massive amounts of foreign
assistance, the economy became dollarized, which only benefited the elites. The elites had
exclusive access to the United States currency and, as H.E. Tay Nay Im noted, U.S. dollars, or
“‘green,’ as it was called, was for the rich and people put it aside for a rainy day.”58
The rice production in the Khmer Republic dropped from 2,503,000 metric tons in 1968
to only 762,000 metric tons by the end of 1974.59 In 1973 alone, the U.S. arranged 30,000 tons of
rice to be shipped to Cambodia along with $30 million in economic monetary aid.60 As the Thai
ambassador noted in 1973, “Cambodia used to export [rice]. Now they import.”61 Not only had
Cambodia become dependent on United States economic assistance, but also due in large part to
corruption, foodstuff often did not reach the peasantry. Moreover, when it did reach the starving
peasantry, it was often unbearably expensive due to inflation, lack of supply, or unequal currency
exchanges. According to the World Health Organization, a kilo of rice cost 300 riels by May of
1974—much too expensive for the peasantry to afford. In other instances, the peasantry did not
even have a chance to purchase the rice as the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) sold
the rice, which at times had been artificially set low to make it affordable, in Thailand or
Vietnam to make a handsome profit.62 There were also reports that the GKR was selling rice to
the Chinese and selling United States military supplies and medicines to Cambodian and
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Vietnamese communist forces.63 Such corruption not only undermined the purpose of the aid
provided by the United States, but also inhibited Cambodia’s ability to stabilize its economy.

Year Zero: The End of Modernity
As the Lon Nol government continued to implode, the United States tried to fortify
Cambodia with more aid, but to no avail. There was little possibility of resurrecting the
Cambodian economy by 1974 due to rural unrest and because the United States was providing 95
percent of the Khmer Republic’s revenue with only 2 percent representing own-source revenue.
The Khmer Rouge was too strong; Cambodia’s attempt at modernization had failed to resist
communism. As the economic situation worsened, all the United States could do was request
more aid allocations for Cambodia from Congress. For the 1975 fiscal year, Washington asked
for $750 million dollars in additional aid to be allocated to Cambodia.64 Jean-Daniel Gardère,
quoting Rémy Prud’homme, noted, foreign aid “‘fills the hole that it digs.’” 65 On April 17, 1975,
the Khmer Rouge captured Phnom Penh. Cambodia’s U.S.-backed twenty-year attempt at
modernization had failed. The Pol Pot regime quickly undid any hints of modernity by
transforming Cambodia into a society without currency, without industry, and without markets.
Or, as the Khmer Rouge referred to it as, Cambodia had been reverted to “Year Zero.”
Modernity, coupled with mass consumerism, seemed to be a logical antidote to
communist infiltration, but states often needed external assistance to modernize effectively.
However, in Cambodia’s case, a vicious cycle presented itself due to its reliance on foreign
assistance: Cambodia’s weak economy required United States aid, which then increased
government corruption and dependence on such aid, which then only quickened Cambodia’s
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economic decay. The Sangkum denounced foreign parasites within the Cambodian economy, but
such denouncements meant little. In reality, Cambodia fostered close economic ties to the United
States and never untied them. Sihanouk’s relationship with the East precipitated a United States
mission to find an alternative to his communist sympathies, but backing the Lon Nol government
neither repelled communism nor modernized Cambodia’s economy. The Lon Nol government
did not encourage economic stability—much to the contrary. As a consequence, with the United
States heavily bombing Cambodia and funding the extravagant lifestyles of the Lon Nol officials,
the economy spiraled into dissolution. The United States’ attempt to fortify Indochina against
communistic encroachment conflicted with its primary objective of economic stability;
modernizing Cambodia became an afterthought. Thus, by 1975, both objectives had failed.
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